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Abstract: In the Principles, Descartes announces his intention to de-
liver an “exact account of morals” which would crown his philosophical 
project and aim at nothing less than the “perfection and felicity of life”. 
The development of such a perfect system of morals, however, presup-
poses a complete knowledge of all the other sciences, and will require 
their completion before it can be brought to light. Morality thus appears 
as the end of Cartesian philosophy, and this in a double sense: morality 
will be the last science to appear, but it will also bring forth the actual 
fulfillment of the philosophical project, its final and most perfect result. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine, through a close reading of the 
continuities and interruptions that puncture Descartes’ works, the am-
biguous character of such ethical promise, and the conditions in which 
such realization of philosophy did not take place.
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“Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphys-
ics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are 
all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principal ones, 
namely medicine, mechanics and morals. By “morals” I understand the 
Ramon Llull Journal_04_2013.indd   9 26/07/13   08:30
10 RAMON LLULL JOURNAL OF APPLIED ETHICS 2013. ISSUE 4 PP. 9-29
highest and most perfect moral system, which presupposes a complete 
knowledge of the other sciences and is the ultimate level of wisdom”
Principles of Philosophy, Preface to the French Edition
The metaphor of the tree is an enigmatic way of access to Cartesian 
morality. In fact, the metaphor posits a certain number of problems when 
considered in the broader context of Descartes’ philosophy. The reasons 
for this problematicity do not derive only from the fact that Descartes 
never provided the “exact account of medicine, morals and mechanics” 
that he ambiguously announced in the Principles.1 They have to do as 
well with the very logic that animates the metaphor, with the double 
function that is at work in its characterization of philosophy.
The image seems in fact to work at least in two different manners. 
First, it provides us with the idea of a fundamental unity: the philo-
sophical tree is an organic whole, in which the different “parts” or limbs 
are integrated, united in a fundamental continuity that runs from the first 
principles of the metaphysical roots to the ultimate benefits of practical 
philosophy. But secondly, this image is presented as a projection. The 
tree, as it were, is not yet fully grown: it still lacks its branches, which 
are simply anticipated or foreseen. The unity of the organic whole appears 
thus as it will look like in a future state, and is seen from the perspective 
of an actual state of incompleteness.
In the metaphor of the tree, hence, the organicity of philosophy is 
inscribed upon a temporal logic of realization. The perfect system of 
morals, which presupposes a “complete knowledge” of the other sci-
ences, would presumably coincide with the overcoming of this temporal 
lack, and thus with the full achievement of the organic plenitude an-
nounced and anticipated by the metaphor. The purpose of this paper is 
to examine, through a close reading of Descartes’ works, the conditions 
in which such realization of philosophy did not take place.
1 Principles of Philosophy, Preface to the French Edition, Adam and Tannery 
Edition, Vol. IXB: page 17; Cambridge Edition, Vol. I: page 188. Thereafter referred 
to as PP, followed by Volume: Page of the Adam and Tannery edition; this will be 
employed for all the references to Descartes’ writings. In this passage of the Principles, 
Descartes affirms not to “feel so old, or so diffident about my powers, or so far away 
from knowledge on these remaining topics”, as to doubt about his capacity to per-
fectly achieve his project. However, he points to his financial difficulties as the main 
obstacle which separated him for that completion.
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THE ORGANIC PARADOX OF MORALITY
The metaphor of the tree is not exclusive of the Principles. As early 
as in the Regulae, for example, we were already told of certain “first 
seeds” of reason which are sown in us and “bear spontaneous fruits”; we 
heard about “harvests” that are richer than others in such fruits; we were 
assured that even the most difficult disciplines of knowledge can “achieve 
perfect maturity”, if only they are “cultivated with extreme care”.2 As if 
the seeds of these beginnings, cultivated through a life of careful labor, 
had brought forth the imposing presence of the philosophical tree, the 
metaphor of the organic reality of knowledge extends between the two 
edges of Cartesian philosophy.
The idea of organicity posits the axiom of a perfect and homogeneous 
continuity between the contents of knowledge. The philosophical tree 
appears in fact as the result of a single and unitary process: properly nur-
tured, the different limbs or parts which compose it (the roots, the trunk, 
the branches), develop in time by growing from one another. But if the 
tree is to preserve this unity, and to witness for the harmonic integration 
of all its contents into the ordered, organic whole of philosophical knowl-
edge, a double condition must be satisfied: all the contents of knowledge 
must share a certain commensurability, and their accumulation must 
proceed in an ordered, methodical fashion.
The universal structures of reason, first, guarantee the essential unity 
of philosophical knowledge. In the confrontation between reason and the 
object, the stress is thus systematically put on the labors of reason. Un-
derlying every classification or division between the “branches” of 
knowledge, there is an essential, fundamental equality in the condition of 
all that is known –precisely in so far as it can be known by means of 
reason, as it becomes problem or object of reason.3 Reason, as the first 
rule for the direction of the mind already stated, can form “true and sound 
judgments about whatever comes before it”: by referring to reason’s 
2 Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule Four, IX:373; 1:17. Thereafter referred 
to as RDM.
3 See for example in Rule Thirteen: “we should not regard some branches of our 
knowledge of things as more obscure than others, since they are all of the same nature 
and consist simply in the putting together of self-evident facts” (RDM IX:428; 1:50); 
or in the Discourse on the Method: “all the things which can fall under human knowl-
edge are interconnected” (Discourse on the Method, Part two, VI:19; 1:120. There-
after referred to as DM).
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potential objects of application, “whatever” stands here for the entirety 
of the knowable world.4 As long as the judgment respects the conditions 
for the systematic labors of methodical reason, its product will become 
rational, commensurate and unitary “organic knowledge”.
Thus philosophy appears as a unitary whole whose contents are linked 
by a fundamental continuity. This is the essential content of the definition 
that Descartes provides in the preface to the French edition of the Prin-
ciples, just a few pages before announcing the metaphor of the tree: 
philosophy, says Descartes, concerns the study of wisdom, and as such it 
“encompasses everything which the human mind is capable of knowing”.5 
In order for this wisdom to be perfect, reason must always seek clear and 
distinct knowledge, proceeding systematically from the simplest to the 
most complex while treating each singular problem. This is also how the 
totality of its contents must be deduced from first causes, advancing care-
fully through entirely clear chains of deductions. According to the Prin-
ciples, this is primarily what to “philosophize” means.6
Of course, many similar statements can be signaled through Descartes’ 
opus. But the peculiarity of this passage of the Preface resides in the fact 
that this definition of philosophy is framed within a temporal description 
of its progress. Descartes explains here how philosophy must be developed, 
both in learning and production, if it is to attain its utmost perfection. 
Philosophy, so he says, must follow a precise order of realization, leading 
from the first principles of metaphysics to the highest perfection of mor-
als. Should this order be followed to the end, philosophy cannot fail to 
provide us with its ultimate benefits, namely the “knowledge of all things 
that mankind is capable of knowing, both for the conduct of life and for 
4 RDM, Rule One, IX:359; 1:9. It is revelatory that one year after the composition 
of the Rules, Descartes gave to his following work precisely the title The World. In 
his preface to this work, Robert Stoothoff reproduces the following words, addressed 
by Descartes to Mersenne in November 1649: “instead of explaining only one phe-
nomenon, I have resolved to explain all the phenomena of Nature, i.e. Physics” 
(Translator’s preface to The World, 1:79).
5 PP, Preface to the French Edition, IXB:3; 1:180.
6 Ibid. IXB:2; 1:179. This is the exact passage from the Preface: “thus, in order to 
set about acquiring [wisdom] –and it is this activity to which the term “to philosophize” 
strictly refers- we must start with the search for first causes or principles”. Though the 
term “wisdom” acquires a particular relevance in the Principles, already in the Rules 
we can find a definition highly attuned with this later use: “for the sciences as a whole 
are nothing other than human wisdom, which always remains one and the same, 
however different the subjects to which it is applied” (RDM X:360; 1:9).
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the preservation of health and the discovery of all manner of skills”.7 The 
ordered unity of wisdom is therefore defined by reference to its ultimate, 
fundamentally practical vocation: wisdom aims, as a last horizon, at ac-
quiring skills, at preserving health, at rightly conducting our life. Moral-
ity, the highest branch of the philosophical tree, will then emerge as the 
ultimate benefit of philosophy.8
This conclusion confronts us with what might be called the organic 
paradox of morality. This paradox can be synthesized in an ambiguous 
statement, which must be understood at the same time in both of its two 
possible meanings: Cartesian morality appears as the end of philosophy. 
Morality, as the metaphor of the tree clearly stated, is the last discipline 
of human knowledge: it comes at the chronological end of the philo-
sophical project, it is the last science to appear. But like medicine or 
mechanics, morals are still a branch of the philosophical tree. As such, 
hence, the “science of morals” must necessarily satisfy the conditions of 
the unified and ordered production of knowledge.
But morality is not just another branch of philosophy: it is as well its 
main goal and purpose, it is what knowledge is supposed to produce as its 
last and most perfect result, as the final end for which all the previous de-
velopments are means. The global project of knowledge, according to the 
Descartes of the Principles, aims at nothing less than “perfection and felic-
ity of life”:9 the highest, most perfect moral system appears hence as noth-
ing other than the ultimate fulfillment of this vocation. Consequently, 
morals are at the same time the last means and the first end of philosophy.
The paradox can hence be restated in the following terms. On the one 
hand, if morality is to become a constitutive branch of knowledge (even 
7 PP IXB:2; 1:179.
8 See for instance: “the principal benefit of philosophy depends on those parts of 
it which can only be learnt last of all” (PP IXB:15; 1:186). Descartes expresses in these 
passages his wish to replace the “speculative philosophy taught in the schools” with a 
fundamentally practical philosophy, fully dedicated to the improvement of life.
9 This link of finality between the production of knowledge and the conduct of 
life in its manifold aspects explicitly appears several times throughout the entirety of 
Descartes’ works. See for example in the First Rule, where it is affirmed that one should 
“consider simply how to increase the natural light of his reason, not with a view to 
solving this or that scholastic problem, but in order that his intellect should show his 
will what decision it ought to make in each of life’s contingencies” (RDM X:361; 
1:10); or in the first part of the Discourse: “And it was always my earnest desire to 
learn to distinguish the true from the false in order to see clearly into my own actions 
and proceed with confidence in this life” (DM VII:9-10; 1:115).
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if, chronologically, it is the youngest one), it must still satisfy the condi-
tions of philosophical organicity: its object must be susceptible of being 
subsumed under the priority of systematic and methodical reason. But 
on the other hand, according to the Cartesian anticipation morality is 
not just a part of the organic unity of knowledge, not even the last stage 
of its development. Morality is in addition the actual fulfillment of the 
philosophical project; it is a culmination that brings forth its final and 
most perfect result. This realization, Descartes warns us, presupposes a 
complete and perfect knowledge of all the other sciences. This is the 
second aspect of Descartes’ paradox of morality: in order for this realiza-
tion to take place, everything must be perfectly completed beforehand. 
It is as if true morality could only appear in a future state of “highest 
perfection”, or not to appear at all.
UNFOLDING OF THE PARADOX (I): THE TRUE AND THE GOOD
The first necessary condition for the emergence of the perfect system 
of morals, then, is that this system be a constitutive branch of philosophy. 
This presupposes a fundamental adequacy between morality and organic 
knowledge: the moral object must be capable of being determined by the 
priority of methodical reason. In the Meditations, however, Descartes 
seems to provide us with a clear refutation of this condition by repeat-
edly establishing a clear separation between the acts of speculative reason 
and everything that pertains to the conduct of life. Should this separation 
be justified, the domain of practical life could simply not be included 
within the realm of philosophical knowledge. The perspective of elaborat-
ing a perfect science of morals, then, could hardly be anything more than 
a chimerical illusion.
The question might be better posed by considering one of the subjects 
that raised most concerns among the contemporary commentators of the 
Meditations, to the point that Descartes himself, after reading some of 
their objections, decided to add an explanatory paragraph to the synopsis 
of the work, asking expressly from the editor to “put the words in brack-
ets so that it can be seen that they have been added”.10 The concerns that 
this supplement was meant to address referred to the necessity of establish-
10 Letter to Mersenne, March 18 1641. Included in footnote 1 of Meditations on 
First Philosophy, VIII:15; 2:11. Thereafter referred to as M.
Ramon Llull Journal_04_2013.indd   14 26/07/13   08:30
15BUSTINDUY
TWO OR THREE BATTLES: ORGANICITY AND TEMPORALITY
IN CARTESIAN ETHICS
ing a difference between two kinds of errors: errors made in the distinction 
between truth and falsity, on the one hand, and those made in the distinc-
tion between good and evil, on the other. Thus Arnauld, in the fourth 
set of objections, affirms that the former distinction is all that is needed 
for Descartes’ project, and he enjoins him consequently to clarify that he 
was “dealing solely with matters concerned with the sciences and intel-
lectual contemplation, and not with matters belonging to faith and the 
conduct of life”.11 In reply to this claim, the passage whose later inclusion 
Descartes wanted us to notice states as follows: “(But here it should be 
noted in passing that I do not deal at all with sin, i.e. error which is com-
mitted in pursuing good and evil, but only with error that occurs in 
distinguishing truth from falsehood. And there is no discussion of matters 
pertaining to faith or the conduct of life, but simply of speculative truths 
which are known solely by means of the natural light)”.12
Descartes fully satisfies Arnauld’s demand. He explains that the 
Meditations are a work dealing exclusively with the speculative contem-
plation of truth. In his replies, he underlines a passage from the first 
Meditation in which he explicitly claims that the task he his confronting 
“does not involve action but merely the acquisition of knowledge”.13 
According to Descartes’ explanation, we are facing here a false problem. 
The Meditations concern only the search for first principles; they are 
restricted to the status of a metaphysical investigation on the roots of all 
possible knowledge, his goal being exclusively to explore the conditions 
under which indubitable truths can be produced. This, Descartes says, is 
the context in which his investigation of the nature of error must also be 
understood.
Now, if we follow Descartes’ warning, we should assert that the con-
clusions of the fourth Meditation apply only to the contemplation of 
truth, and not the pursuit of the good in practical life. These conclusions, 
let us remind it, combined the diagnosis of the inevitability of error with 
a pragmatic solution consisting in its systematic avoidance. Errors, Des-
cartes explains, derive from a fundamental inadequacy between the limi-
tation of the human intellect and the infinity of our will: we make mistakes 
11 Fourth Set of Objections and Replies,VII:216; 2:152. Thereafter referred to as 
OR. Similar concerns, and the consequent replies, can be found in the Second (VII:126-
27; 2:90), Fifth (VII:351; 2:243) and Seventh Sets of Objections (VII: 460; 2:308).
12 M VIII:15; 2:11.
13 M VIII:22; 2:15.
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whenever we extend our ability to judge beyond the domain of certain 
knowledge. Being limited creatures, we cannot completely escape the 
possibility of being mistaken, because we cannot have a clear and distinct 
perception of everything we may be able to deliberate upon.14 What we 
can do, however, is to acquire the systematic habit of avoiding error, an 
ability which Descartes describes as “man’s greatest and most important 
perfection”,15 and that simply consists in avoiding those judgments in 
which the intellect has no clear and distinct perception about the issue at 
stake. Lacking a solid basis for its determination, says Descartes, in such 
cases the will cannot but be indifferent about the matter, and it “easily 
turns aside from what is true and good, and this is the source of my error 
and sin”.16
This conflation of truth and goodness cannot but be shocking, given 
Descartes’ insistent underlining of the distinction between the two. 
The passage makes clear enough that the faculty of the will, in its 
being determined by the intellect (and thus in its liability to error), 
cannot be the instance that authorizes such distinction. So the ques-
tion arises: does reason act in the same way in the acquisition of 
knowledge and in moral decisions? Is there any difference, as Descartes 
repeatedly indicates, between falsity with regards to truth and error 
with regards to goodness?
The possibility of establishing an essential parallelism between the 
application of reason both to theoretical and moral judgments seems to 
14 This impossibility is expressed in M VIII:61; 2:43. In the fourth Meditation, 
Descartes famously explains the nature of error as the result of our “middle” onto-
logical position: “my nature is such that in so far as I was created by the supreme being, 
there is nothing in me to enable me to go wrong (...); but in so far as I participate in 
nothingness or non-being, (...) I am lacking in countless respects, it is no wonder that 
I make mistakes” (M VIII:54; 2:38).
15 M VIII:62; 2:43. This passage of the Meditations should be compared with 
Principles 37: “the supreme perfection of man is that he acts freely or voluntarily, and 
it is this which makes him deserve praise or blame” (PP XIXB:18; 1:205).
16 My emphasis, M VIII:58; 2:40-41. It is very important to remind that, in the 
Fourth Set of Objections, Arnauld had included his comments on the conduct of life in 
a section called “Points that may cause difficulty to Theologians”. So the question of faith 
inevitably plays an important role in Descartes’ effort to distinguish speculative reason 
from the conduct of life, though it is difficult to establish the actual extent of this influ-
ence. The passage on supernatural illumination states as follows: “the clarity or transpar-
ency which can induce our will to give its assent is of two kinds: the first comes from 
natural light, while the second comes from divine grace” (OR VII:147; 2:105).
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be confirmed, at first, negatively. In the second set of replies, Descartes 
argues about the exceptional status of faith. He introduces then a funda-
mental difference between matters of faith and matters of knowledge, 
establishing that the will can be informed in its act of choice by two causes, 
namely the natural light of reason or the “supernatural illumination” of 
the divine grace.17 However, this “second cause” for the determination 
of the will is clearly not applicable to matters concerning the conduct of 
life. In the absence of a third cause, the realm of practical life seems to be 
subject to the exact same process of intellection. Morals would then imply 
nothing other than the freedom of an infinite will, acting either upon 
clear and distinct knowledge, or upon a state of fundamental indifference 
that corresponds to an absence of reasons.
Descartes seems to confirm this hypothesis in a passage from the 
second set of replies where he is attempting to clarify the uncanny 
implications of his conflation of truth and goodness in the fourth 
Meditation. The passage says: “in matters that may be embraced by the 
will, I made a very careful distinction between the conduct of life and 
the contemplation of truth. As far as the conduct of life is concerned, 
I am very far from thinking that we should assent only to what is clear-
ly perceived. On the contrary, I do not think that we should always 
wait even for probable truths; from time to time we will have to choose 
one of many alternatives about which we have no knowledge, and once 
we have made our choice, so long as no reason against it can be produced, we 
must stick to it as firmly as if it had been chosen for transparently clear 
reasons”.18
We must conclude two things from Descartes’ words. First, that as 
we suspected, the faculty of judgment, consisting in the articulation of 
intellect and will, acts fundamentally in the same way both for the pursuit 
of the true and of the good. Secondly, that in what pertains the conduct 
17 Second Set of Replies, VII:149; 2:106.
18 In Principles 31-42, Descartes reproduces the investigation on the nature of 
error in similar terms as those of the Meditations. It is quite significant that judgment 
is referred there to in terms of action. Thus Principle 38 states: “the fact that we fall 
into error is a defect in the way we act or in the use we make of our freedom, but not 
a defect in our nature. For our nature remains the same whether we judge correctly 
or incorrectly” (PP XIXB:19; 1:205). This is immediately preceded by 37, which 
affirms that “it is a supreme perfection in man that he acts voluntarily, that is, freely; 
this makes him in a special way the author of his actions and deserving of praise for 
what he does” (PP IXB:18; 1:205).
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of life, and thus the pursuit of virtue, the will is often in a position of 
inevitable indifference, which makes us prone to constant misjudgments 
and mistakes. But is this reading really correct? Can the analysis of error 
be extended, against Descartes’ warning in the Meditations, to the domain 
of practical and moral life? And if so, to what extent can morals avoid 
this indifference of the will, and thus its imperfection and error?
The beginning of an answer to these questions may be found in the 
dedicatory letter of the Principles.19 There, Descartes addresses to princess 
Elizabeth a reflection on the nature of virtue, distinguishing between 
apparent virtues and true ones. The main difference between the two, he 
says, is that true virtues arise from an exact “knowledge of what is right”, 
while apparent ones derive from a certain ignorance or “error”.20 In so 
far as they derive from perfect knowledge, true virtues have “one and the 
same nature” and are included under the single name of “wisdom”. And 
this wisdom, he says, needs only two prerequisites to arise: “perception 
of the intellect and disposition of the will”.21
In the last work he published during his lifetime, the Passions of 
the soul, Descartes provides us with a similar argument. He affirms 
there that the “chief utility of morality” consists in the ability to control 
our desires. This control is necessary because desire is what mediates 
between the passion of the soul and its realization in action. Thus the 
work of morality consists in establishing two things: first, whether that 
desire depends on ourselves or on some other external cause; secondly, 
to what extent it participates in “goodness”. As a combination of the 
two, the pursuit of virtue consists in “doing the good things that depend 
on us”.22 But how are we to distinguish the goodness of our desire, and 
thus the consequent goodness of the action it will produce? Once again, 
Descartes’ answer is very explicit: “desire is always good when it con-
19 PP, Dedicatory Letter. IXB:2; 1:190-191. This explicit address of the question 
of virtue is rare in Descartes. However, even here he never defines what determines 
the knowledge of goodness. At the end of the day, Descartes himself would be liable 
of the same fault that he attributes, in the Discourse, to the moral writings of the 
Ancients: “I compared the moral writings of the ancient pagans to very proud and 
magnificent palaces built only in sand and mud. They extol the virtues, and make them 
appear more estimable than anything else in the world; but they do not adequately 
explain how to recognize a virtue” (DM VI:8; 1:114).
20 PP, Dedicatory Letter, IXB:2; 1:191.
21 Id.3 191 1.
22 The Passions of the Soul, part two, IX:436; 1:379. Thereafter referred to as PS.
Ramon Llull Journal_04_2013.indd   18 26/07/13   08:30
19BUSTINDUY
TWO OR THREE BATTLES: ORGANICITY AND TEMPORALITY
IN CARTESIAN ETHICS
forms to true knowledge; likewise it cannot fail to be bad when based 
on some error”.23
Thus the parallel appears to be constantly ratified: the pursuit of the 
good follows exactly the same rules and conditions that apply for the 
pursuit of truth. The same faculty, acting exactly through the same 
mechanisms, is responsible for our choice of the true or the false, what 
is good or what is evil. Speculative knowledge and moral knowledge ap-
pear both under the same light, the light of wisdom that allows to over-
come the limitations and weaknesses of human nature either through 
perfect knowledge or through the avoidance of error. The difference 
between knowledge and action, between science and practical life, is de-
finitively not to be found in the relation between reason and its object.24 
The first necessary condition for the emergence of morals, its commen-
surability with the proceedings of organic reason, appears then to be 
wholly verified.
So why does Descartes emphasize so insistently the distinction between 
the contemplation of truth and the pursuit of goodness? As we have seen, 
this distinction cannot be due to any incommensurability between 
moral and rational judgments. Consequently, there must be something 
in practical life that makes it impossible for us to escape the indifference 
of the will, its failure to control a desire or to recognize a virtue. There 
must be something that makes us especially prone to error in those cases. 
The conclusive paragraph of the Meditations states: “But since the pres-
sure of things to be done does not always allow us to stop and make such 
a meticulous check, it must be admitted that in this human life we are 
often liable to make mistakes about particular things, and we must ac-
knowledge the weakness of our nature”.25 That something that makes us 
23 PS IX:436-437; 1:379).
24 In a sense, this profound unity of reason is precisely what informed Descartes’ 
argumentation of the peculiarity of the human. When in the Discourse he conjectured 
the existence of a machine that would perfectly imitate our actions “for all practical 
purposes”, he affirmed that one would still be able to distinguish it from humans, 
because of its lack of reason. Reason, he said then, is a “universal instrument” that can 
be used in all the contingencies of life, in all kind of situations. Reason “makes us act”, 
while “Nature acts through animals”: in the last instance, this indistinctness between 
the rational and the practical is what singularizes us and makes us unique: “it is for all 
practical purposes impossible for a machine to have enough different organs to make 
it act in all the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us act” (DM 
VI:56-57; 1:139-140).
25 M VIII:90; 2:62.
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fail in human life, then, must have something to do with the “pressure 
of things to be done”: a pressure that, as we already saw, does often not 
allow us the time to wait “even for probable truths”.
UNFOLDING OF THE PARADOX (II) VELOCITY  
AND THE PROVISIONAL
The velocity of life makes it impossible for us to “stop and check” 
before judging moral and practical issues. Even if morals proceed accord-
ing to reason, moral judgments are somehow overwhelmed by the rhythm 
of life, by the urgency of things that have to be decided without allowing 
us to wait until we find about their truth. No doubt that this lack of time 
is responsible for most of our particular errors. Descartes repeatedly 
identified this urgency as one of the main dangers in the use of reason, 
even when treating of mathematical problems. “Frequently people, he 
says in the Regulae, are in such a hurry in their investigation of problems 
that they set about solving them with their minds blank”.26 When facing 
complex objects or situations, we need time in order to arrive either at a 
final clear and distinct perception or at the acknowledgment that we are 
in a position of indifference. Little wonder, then, if in speculative reason-
ing we are often slow, and in practical life, wrong.
So how could this imperfection be neutralized? How could moral-
ity overcome that pressure of time, which places us in a position of 
recurrent indifference, and thus makes practical errors almost inevitable? 
As we have seen, Descartes seems to provide us with a simple answer 
to these questions. We will avoid mistakes in practical life only in so 
far as we have clear and distinct knowledge about what is to be decided 
or done, be it the pursuit of virtue, the control of a passion or any 
other instance of intervention of the will. The urgency of practical time, 
then, could only be overcome by a substantial increase in our knowledge 
26 RDM, Rule Thirteen, X:434; 1:54. Descartes follows this assertion by a curious 
similitude in terms of action: “They are thus behaving like a foolish servant who, sent 
on some errand by his master, is so eager to obey that he dashes off without instruc-
tions and without knowing where he is to go”. In a different level, this dependence of 
thought upon time is clearly intuited by Arnauld, who in the introduction to his 
Fourth Set of Objections affirms: “the work you are giving to me to scrutinize requires 
(...) above all a calm mind, which can be free from the hurly-burly of all external things 
and have the leisure to consider itself” (OR VII:197; 2:138).
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of the good; that is by a better and more perfect understanding of what 
is to be done.
In a sense, this is exactly what the second condition for the emergence 
of true morals already stated. In order to have true morality, so the Carte-
sian anticipation announced, we need to achieve beforehand the completion 
of all the other sciences, we need the most perfect and complete accumula-
tion and development of all philosophical knowledge. Our present condition 
of fragility and error, then, would be nothing but a transitory state, the 
imperfect uncertainty in which we wait for the attainment of the future, 
perfect completion of wisdom. Of course, this condition of provisionality 
is at the very heart of Descartes’ most famous treatment of the question of 
morals, namely his description of an “imperfect” moral code that should 
be followed “provisionally while we do not yet know a better one”.27
Since life admits no delay, says Descartes in the Discourse, as long as 
we are in this transitory state we will undoubtedly be forced to take 
uncertain decisions, that is, decisions that may possibly be wrong. In those 
cases, he explains, we must stick to those decisions as if they were undoubt-
edly true, and never abandon them as long as no reason can be produced 
against them.28 But this moral code, he emphasizes, is indeed an imperfect 
27 PP IXB:15; 1:186. This moral code is first presented in the introduction of the 
Discourse, where Descartes characterizes it in a normative fashion, as a set of “moral 
rules derived from [the] method” (DM VI:1; 1:111).
28 This is the passage of the Discourse in which, explaining the reasons why the 
provisional moral code must be adopted, Descartes says: “since in everyday life we 
must often act without delay, it is a most certain truth that when it is not in our 
power to discern the truest opinions, we must follow the most probable. Even when 
no opinions appear more probable than any others, we must still adopt some; and 
having done so we must regard them as not doubtful, from a practical point of view, 
but as most true and certain, on the grounds that the reason which made us adopt them 
is itself true and certain”(DM VI:24-25; 1:123). A similar treatment of the question 
of provisionality can be found in the Principles: “so long as we possess only the kind 
of knowledge that is acquired by the first four degrees of wisdom we should not doubt 
the probable truths which concern the conduct of life, while at the same time we should 
not consider them to be so certain that we are incapable of changing our views when 
we are obliged to do so by some evident reason” (PP IXB:7; 1:182). In the above 
mentioned passage of the Discourse, Descartes compares this attitude to that of a 
traveler lost in the middle of a forest, who should not doubt in his determination once 
a direction has been chosen for his march. The metaphor of the traveler, grounded 
upon his own biographical narration, is often used as a symbol of curiosity, destruction 
of prejudices and openness of mind. The ethical implications of this metaphor would 
deserve a more detailed analysis.
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and provisional one. It is a transitory necessity that will disappear when 
the edifice of wisdom, our new home under construction,29 is finally 
completed. So our practical uncertainty is inscribed upon a temporal 
logic of disappearance: the overcoming of our imperfection will presum-
ably coincide with the achievement of the philosophical project. What 
confers to our fragility its provisional character, then, is precisely the 
certainty of this future realization of philosophy. A realization, conse-
quently, that would definitively sanction our moral victory over the 
urgency of time.
But how could we understand the terms of such a victory? If philoso-
phy is to free us from the uncertainty of the provisional, as we have just 
seen, it will do so only by achieving first the totality of its project. Perfec-
tion and completeness, then, are the conditions upon which this victory 
of knowledge could be grounded. So let us examine now the two condi-
tions of this achievement.
Of course, in thinking of Cartesian perfection one would immedi-
ately be tempted to think of infinity. The urgency of time would com-
pletely disappear if we had such thing as absolute knowledge: we only 
need time because our intellect is limited, and we would not need it at all 
if an immediate, absolutely perfect knowledge were at our disposal. Des-
cartes himself, in another remarkable conflation of virtue and truth in 
the Meditations, says: “If I always saw clearly what is true and good, I 
should never have to deliberate about the right judgment or choice”.30 
However, this is clearly not compatible with the acknowledgment of the 
weakness of human nature that Descartes constantly identifies throughout 
his works. Wisdom encompasses “everything that can be known by the 
mind”, that is, everything that falls within its limited range of possibilities.
On the other hand, it is precisely “man’s greatest perfection” what 
may allow us to achieve perfection within the possible. Perfection, then, 
29 In the Discourse, Descartes compares the provisional moral code to a place 
where one can comfortably live while he is rebuilding his house: “before starting to 
rebuild your house, it is not enough simply to pull it down, to make provision for 
materials and architects (...) and to have carefully drawn up the plans; you must also 
provide yourself with some other place where you can live comfortably while building 
is in progress. Likewise, lest I should remain indecisive in my actions while reason 
obliged me to be so in my judgments, and in order to live as happily as I could during 
this time, I formed for myself a provisional moral code consisting of just three or four 
maxims” (DM VI:22; 1:122).
30 M VIII:59; 2:49.
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should be understood in a relative, almost negative sense: perfection is 
simply conceived as the absence of error.31 Even if our knowledge is not 
absolute, it will still be perfect in as much as we have no doubts with 
regards to its certainty, if the truth of what is known appears clear and 
distinctly as indubitable. So the perfect knowledge announced by Descartes 
will not be absolute in the sense of omniscience. It will necessarily be 
relative, and proportional to our own limits. True morality, then, will 
be grounded upon a “relatively” perfect knowledge. And as such, its 
perfection must also be understood in necessarily relative terms.
However, this relative perfection of true morals seems to be deeply 
problematic. In fact, a relatively perfect science of morals could consist, 
for instance, in a restricted set of true knowledge from which any pos-
sibility of error would be absolutely excluded. But in fact, this restricted 
knowledge would clearly not be enough to wholly overcome the urgent 
velocity of things. Even if perfect, a limited moral code should have to 
confront situations in which certain knowledge about what is to be done 
would be lacking. In those cases, it would still be necessary to take un-
grounded decisions, and thus we would still be in a position of fragility, 
prone to making the wrong choices or decisions.
So even a perfect science of morals would be at least partially submit-
ted to the urgency of time, and thus to the possibility of error. As such, 
it would not be able to wholly overcome the “provisional” state of un-
certainty of the practical. When in the second set of replies Descartes 
grounds the distinction between speculative judgments and the conduct 
of life upon this uncertainty of the practical decision, without making 
any reference to the provisional character of the maxim, he seems to be 
acknowledging this very conclusion: the urgency of things will never be 
wholly overcome by the Cartesian edifice of knowledge. The provi-
sional uncertainty of the practical, consequently, seems to aim at a relative 
permanence or normalization.32
31 Of course, this conception of a “relative perfection” could be highly problem-
atic for Descartes. However, several times he explains the “perfection” of knowledge 
as an absolute certainty which is guaranteed by its being derived from absolutely true 
first principles (see for instance in Principles IXB:2; 1:179: “in order for this kind of 
knowledge to be perfect it must be deduced from first causes”).
32 The provisional moral code prescribed to our practical actions something like 
this maxim: while we are waiting to know what should be done, we must act as if we 
already knew what to do. Once the dimension of the provisional is normalized, the 
status of practical choices would probably change its referent. In fact, one could think 
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So true morals will only be able to win a relative victory over time. 
And still, even this mutilated victory cannot be taken for granted. In fact, 
true morality presupposes not only perfection, but also completeness of 
knowledge in order to arise. Moreover, it is this condition of “complete-
ness” what ultimately determines the possibility of emergence of morals: 
perfect morality will appear only when all the other sciences have been 
fully realized. In a certain sense, morals will be in a provisional state as 
long as this completeness of all previous knowledge is not actually fulfilled. 
But in what consists such completeness, and how could it be attained?
If we listen to Descartes, knowledge is complete when it has exhaust-
ed all its possibilities and potentialities. And one can even find in his work 
evidence of a certain optimism concerning the task, as if the perspective 
of this ultimate achievement of the philosophical project were not only 
possible but even imminent. Thus after the famous passage of the Dis-
course consecrated to the future developments of the project, where he 
expresses a certain confidence in the program of making ourselves the 
“lords and masters of nature”,33 Descartes characterizes knowledge in the 
that the provisional choice would no longer refer to absolutely certain knowledge, but 
probably to an aspiration at something like moral certainty. Descartes treats twice the 
question of moral certainty in his works. First, in the Discourse, he speaks of a moral 
certainty that we have about evident things, “so that it seems we cannot doubt them 
without being extravagant” although they might be doubted “when it is a question of 
metaphysical certainty” (DM VI:38; 1:130). The second time occurs in part four of the 
Principles. In the French rewrite of Principle 205 (reproduced in footnote 2, 1:289), 
Descartes provides a much more “practical” definition of moral certainty, which is a 
kind of certainty “sufficient to regulate our behavior, or which measures up to the 
certainty we have on matters relating to the conduct of life which we never normally 
doubt, though we know it is possible, absolutely speaking, that they may be false”.
33 This infamous synthesis of the Cartesian project should be understood by con-
sidering what immediately follows this maxim: to become lords and masters of nature, 
apart from enjoying the “fruits” of the earth, would allow us to get rid of “innumer-
able diseases, both of the body and the mind”, and would facilitate, “most impor-
tantly”, the “maintenance of health”, true foundation of every other good (DM VI: 
62; 1:142-143). The fundamental role that Descartes attributed to medicine, as one of 
the most fecund benefits of practical philosophy should not be underestimated while 
analyzing this claim. Concerning the “vices” of the mind, the presence of the metaphor 
of a “health of the mind” can be retraced from the very beginnings of Cartesian phi-
losophy. See for instance in the Observations included in his early writings: “I use the 
term “vices” to refer to the diseases of the mind, which are not so easy to recognize as 
diseases of the body. This is because we have frequently experienced sound bodily 
health, but have never known true health of the mind” (Early Writings X:216; 1:3).
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guise of a war against error, a war whose success depends on the victory 
over very few fundamental and difficult problems. And he affirms cate-
gorically that he needs “to win only two or three other such battles in 
order to achieve my aims completely”.34 The only thing that he needs in 
order to carry out this complete accomplishment, he says, is to plan his 
time carefully. This is because his philosophical project is inscribed 
within the frame a threatening perspective: life, says Descartes, has a 
“short duration”.35 The only thing that could prevent him from complet-
ing the task is, once again, a certain urgency of time, the threatening 
“brevity of life”.
This anxious optimism is radically overthrown in a passage from the 
third part of the Principles. And paradoxically the brevity of life, which 
in the Discourse menaced the possibility of finishing the project, is now 
employed in an opposite, almost optimistic way. The passage in question 
seems to express the logical impossibility of ever attaining a perfectly 
complete knowledge of the sciences. And once again, a later modification 
of the original text appears to subvert its original meaning. Descartes had 
written at first: “the principles which we have so far discovered are so 
vast and so fertile, than their consequences are far more numerous than 
the entire observed contents of the visible world; indeed, they are so 
numerous that we could never make a complete survey of them even in 
our thought”. Now, in the French translation of the text, a fundamental 
precision is included in the last sentence. The consequences are so numer-
ous, so says the later text, that we could “never in a lifetime make a 
complete survey of them even in our thought”.36
The question is relevant because, as such, the original version of the 
text could lead us to believe that in their indefinite potential of application, 
the principles of philosophy would never allow for such thing as a “com-
plete knowledge” of the sciences. If that was the case, the perspective of 
emergence of morality should be indefinitely deferred: without total 
completion of the other parts of the tree, the highest system of morals 
could simply not appear. But the later version cannot but posit a different 
set of problems. In fact, if the task cannot be accomplished in a lifetime 
(as Descartes already feared when he referred to the short duration of his 
life), the project of philosophy should then be conceived as something to 
34 DM VI:67; 1:145.
35 Ibid VI:3; 1:112.
36 PP, Part Three, IXB:80; 1:249 (my emphasis).
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be continued in an indefinite time to come. This is what the last phrase 
of the Preface to the French edition, precisely the version that included 
the later addition, said to conclude the presentation of the philosophical 
project: “My earnest wish is that our descendants may see the happy 
outcome of this project”.37 Those two or three remaining battles, then, 
were not be fought by Descartes alone.
In both cases, however, we are undoubtedly facing a postposition. 
Even the proportional and relative completion of the philosophical proj-
ect, which appeared as imminent in the Discourse, is now deferred to an 
uncertain future, which Descartes describes first as being almost impos-
sible, only to precise later that this impossibility applies exclusively to the 
unity of measure of a man’s life. In any case, the horizon of the complete 
realization of philosophy is undoubtedly delayed, and we seem to be left 
in an indefinite state of provisionality. In this second normalization of 
the provisional, the ultimate aspirations of the philosophical project, 
precisely those that the emergence of perfect morality was supposed to 
realize, cannot but be deeply reformulated.
THE ETHICS OF THE HORIZON
Descartes’ anticipation of a perfect system of morals is thus negated in 
a double sense. First, it is negated by our own epistemic capacities: due 
to the weakness of our nature, we will never be in a position to wholly 
overcome the urgencies of time, to dominate the unmanageable velocity 
of practical life, and hence to exclude the possibility of error. But in a 
second sense, the promise is also negated by its uncertain temporality. 
The reason is that Descartes’ promise acts as a constant movement of 
deferral. Thus, for example, the “perfect felicity” of life whose imminence 
was felt in the Discourse, becomes a “happy outcome” that some improb-
able descendants might bring forth and enjoy in a distant future. In what 
concerns ourselves, everything seems to indicate that the provisional will 
be rather definitive, and that the horizon of Cartesian happiness will 
never be wholly accessible. What we are left with, in this dissolution of 
37 Ibid. IXB:20; 1:190. This directly concerns Descartes’ problematic relation with 
the solitude of the philosopher. Between the Discourse and the Meditations, he inter-
twines affirmations of a self-confident philosophical egoism with solemn calls for the 
constitution of a philosophical vanguard community.
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the imminence of perfect morality, is something like an ideal horizon. It 
is an uncertain promise, perhaps little more than a wish, about the plau-
sibility of progress.
And yet, within that newly restricted moral space there is an element 
that makes this frustrating deferral productive in a different sense. That 
element corresponds to a certain process of self-observation, to some sort 
of practice of the self. The “chief utility of morality” becomes in the Pas-
sions an exploration of oneself, a play on the logic of possibilities and 
limitations that mediates between our reason and our actions, between our 
knowledge and our desires. “What we desire in this way, says Descartes of 
the moderate wishes, cannot fail to have a happy outcome for us, since it 
depends on us alone, and so we always receive from it all the satisfaction 
we expected from it”.38 This is another happy outcome, one that stands for 
an ethics of moderation and self-discovery, of continence and reasonability. 
We are far away indeed from the perfect felicity of the human race.39
So what is the relation between these two poles of Descartes’ ethical 
reflection? The horizon of perfection is condemned to collapse once and 
again under the weight of our own imperfection, but Descartes needs it 
to lead us as an idea. In so far as we participate in universal reason, we 
have the means to progress and avoid errors, both in our knowledge and 
in the conduct of our life: this is the message Descartes cannot renounce 
to proclaim. This is also what announces one of the most recurrent 
metaphors of his philosophy: the idea of the path to truth, an opening of 
roads that lead toward knowledge, toward goodness, toward health. But 
on the other hand, the impossibility to actualize that horizon forces us 
to begin constantly anew. In this sense, nothing will be done for us: the 
path will only open before ourselves while we are actually walking on it.
38 PS IX:437; 1:379.
39 Of course, these ethics of individuality are framed by an explicit political conser-
vatism. The contents of the provisional moral code described in the Discourse can in 
fact be synthesized in two main aspects: obedience to the authorities and a normative 
principle of moderation or continence. Once again, Descartes seems to satisfy Arnauld’s 
concerns in the Meditations: fearing the political consequences of the Cartesian method, 
the objector had quoted the words of Augustine, in chapter 12 of De Utilitate Cre-
dendi: “absolutely nothing in human society will be safe if we decide to believe only 
what we can regard as having been clearly perceived” (OR VII:217; 2:152). To this 
respect, it is significant that, in the Discourse, Descartes explicitly disqualifies any aspi-
ration to social or political transformation. In fact, it is a constant in Descartes that 
every experimentation must first of all secure its own practical conditions of possibility.
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Wisdom becomes hence an attitude to be conquered. The main aspira-
tion of Cartesian ethics, in this sense, is to reinvent the notion of moral 
habit, to make it compatible with that new sovereign individual that is 
to become the subject of the infinite new productions of modernity. Ac-
cording to Descartes, truth and goodness will only be possible in such 
context in so far as a good man, as he characterizes in the Passions the 
prototype of the moral man, will learn to wish them anew with all the 
force of individual reason.40 That force, however, will need to be miti-
gated. The dreams of reason will be necessarily lonely, and remain for-
ever unachieved.
Hence the anticipated realization of philosophy in the perfect felicity 
of life did never take place. For Descartes, morals are indeed a part of 
reason, but precisely as reason they cannot overcome our limitation, 
our dramatic submission to the velocity of life. The organicity of knowl-
edge, responsible for the dream of its perfection, did never produce its 
own realization. Nevertheless, it still accomplishes a double function: 
first, it traces a horizon of perfection that provides us with the idea of a 
possible, indefinite progress. Second, by indefinitely deferring itself, it 
reminds us that philosophy can open the paths leading to that perfection, 
but that those paths will always require from each good man to walk 
them through in the solitude of reason. Between those two poles oscillates 
the moral tragedy of modernity.
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